The tapped network to mind | hostile: any host on the link chooses the bytes of every frame | Frames are parsed by etherparse and the decoder in safe Rust; first-party code has no unsafe. A malformed frame is counted and dropped. A field beyond the payload decodes to null. Decoding one packet costs at most the fields of one message (4,096). Random and truncated payloads are decoded in bite/tests/robustness.rs | built |
| | With two or more interfaces, frames wait in a queue bounded at 65,536 frames and 256 MiB; a frame that does not fit is dropped and counted | built |
| | The process holds only the two capture capabilities, as an unprivileged user, under the systemd sandbox in deployment/first-bite.service (NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=strict, restricted address families, no devices) | built |
| | Packet content reaches the log only as JSON, and the logger writes control characters as escapes, so a packet cannot forge a log line | built |
| Dictionary files to the decoder | supplied by the operator, possibly received from someone else; in the browser, any file a visitor is handed | Limits in bite/src/limits.rs: 4 MiB per file, 10,000 files, 4,096 fields per message, 65,536 entries per values object, fields within the first 65,535 bytes of a payload, JSON nesting of 128. Anything over a limit is reported and left out. bite/tests/hostile_dictionary.rs loads adversarial and damaged dictionaries | built |
| | A dictionary is data: it names bit ranges and labels. Nothing in it is executed, and no name in it becomes a file path. In an object name a topic cannot leave its prefix | built |
| | The decoder page builds the document with text nodes only, reads at most 4 MiB per file and 10,000 files, and draws at most 1,024 bytes of a payload. Files are read in the page and sent nowhere | built |
| | Dictionary signing: a way to check who wrote a dictionary before loading it | not built |
| The ZeroMQ PUB socket to its readers | plaintext and unauthenticated: the socket cannot check who connects, so who reads it is decided by where its owner binds it | The built-in publisher binds 127.0.0.1. A publisher bound to an address other machines can reach logs a warning at startup. The container example publishes the port on the host's loopback only | built |
| | Under a security block (transport.md) a publisher bound to an address that is not loopback stops startup unless allow_plaintext_bind: true is set, and a subscriber that reads the feed from another host stops startup. Consumers on other hosts are served by the Zenoh sink or an HTTPS sink | built |
| | Authentication or encryption on the socket (ZeroMQ CURVE) | not built |
| A publisher socket to a subscriber | the subscriber trusts the configured address to be a first-bite publisher | Messages over 16 MiB are refused by the socket. A record that is not JSON is not forwarded to the REST sink. The topic is sanitised before it is used in an object name or a Zenoh key | built |
| | Record signing: a way for a reader to check that a record came from a given capture point and was not altered | not built |
mind to a sink (REST, Azure Blob Storage, S3, Zenoh) | the endpoint is configured by the operator; the network between is not trusted | TLS certificates are verified for https:// endpoints and there is no setting to turn that off. The REST and Azure clients follow no redirect. An answer is read up to 1 MiB and quoted up to 512 characters. With no security block an http:// endpoint is allowed and sends records in clear: the operator's choice | built |
| | A security block states the level every sink is held to before anything connects: loopback-plaintext, tls or mtls, a minimum TLS version, a key-exchange policy (classical, or the hybrid group X25519MLKEM768 preferred or required) and whether the FIPS module is required. A sink that cannot meet it stops startup. All TLS uses one crypto provider (rustls with aws-lc-rs). mind security show prints what each path will use | built |
| | Credentials are not in configuration files: a key holds a ${NAME} reference resolved from the service environment, or a _file path. A credential is never logged or quoted in an error: its type prints ***, and the S3 sink removes both keys from a store's answer. /etc/first-bite is 0750 root:firstbite, files 0640 | built |
| | Zenoh endpoints, mode and TLS identity come from a standard Zenoh configuration file. With no security block it is passed through unread; under one, its endpoints, scouting and client certificate are checked against the level | built |
| The host | root and the firstbite user are trusted; other local users are not | Record files are created 0640; the log directory and the working directory are 0750; the environment file is 0640 root:firstbite. install.sh sets these on every run | built |
The --mock UDP socket | development only: every datagram becomes a record | Binds 127.0.0.1 unless another address is given | built |
| Contributors to the repository | a pull request is untrusted until reviewed | The controls in SECURITY.md: leak gate, pin check, advisory audit, dependency policy, CodeQL, Scorecard, Dependabot. Commits on main are signed | built |