Security assessment, November 2026

Scope: the tree at commit ff35ab3 and the commits that follow it on the security branch. Scanners were run on Cargo.lock, the published file set (every tracked file outside private/, docs/plan.md and docs/decisions.md), the one-commit history of the public repository, the image the Dockerfile builds, and the workflows. The code named in Manual review was read line by line.

Status words: fixed in a commit (the change is in the tree and its test passes), accepted (left as it is, with the reason), open (not resolved here; the owner is named).

Severity is reasoned from who must control what, and what they gain.

Findings

File and line are those of commit ff35ab3, where the defect was.

IdSeverityComponentFile:lineWhatStatus
F-01Low: needs control of a dictionary file; a panic in builds with overflow checks, a wrong label key in release buildsbitebite/src/schema.rs:214A values key with two signs (--170141183460469231731687303715884105728, -0x-8000…) reached -value with i128::MIN: "attempt to negate with overflow". --5 parsed as 5fixed in d7859ed; bite/tests/hostile_dictionary.rs fails on the old parser
F-02Medium: a dictionary received from someone else exhausts memory or CPU of the decoder, or of the browser tabbitebite/src/dictionary.rs:771, :613, :696, :517, :745No limit on the size of a dictionary file, the number of files, the fields of a message, the entries of a values object or the bit position a field may namefixed in d7859ed: limits in bite/src/limits.rs, listed in docs/dictionary-format.md
F-03Low: CPU, quadratic in the size of one interfacebitebite/src/dictionary.rs:537Every message file was compared against every message_type namefixed in d7859ed
F-04Low: memory and log volumebitebite/src/dictionary.rs:702, :525, :712A finding quoted a dictionary key or label in full, whatever its lengthfixed in d7859ed: quoted text is cut to 80 characters
F-05Low: not reachable through a loaded dictionary; public functionsbitebite/src/bits.rs:53, :58sign_extend with width 0 and swap_bytes with width 0 or over 64 overflow a shiftfixed in d7859ed
F-06Low: needs write access to the dictionary directory; the loader blocksbitebite/src/dictionary.rs:371An entry of vectors/ that is not a regular file (a FIFO named x.json) was opened and readfixed in d7859ed
F-07Medium: a host on the tapped link sends large frames while the pipeline is behind; up to 4 GiB held by the capture processmindmind/src/source.rs:186, :221The queue between capture threads and the pipeline was bounded at 65,536 frames and not in bytesfixed in f5322a1: 256 MiB
F-08Low: a host that can reach UDP 12345 injects records; development mode onlymindmind/src/cli.rs:22--mock bound 0.0.0.0 by defaultfixed in f5322a1
F-09Low: another local user reads records, under a permissive umask and outside the systemd unitmind, flowmind/src/run.rs:61, flow/src/sink/local_log.rs:30, flow/src/sink/message_rates.rs:53, :71Record files were created with the mode the umask allowedfixed in f5322a1, 4655eb0: mode 0640
F-10Medium: whoever controls a topic on the subscribed socket, an HTTP endpoint's error answer or a dictionary file name writes arbitrary lines and terminal escape sequences into the loglogger, flowlogger/src/loggers.rs:65, :75; sources flow/src/subscribe.rs:130, flow/src/sink/mod.rs:40Log arguments were written as they came, line breaks includedfixed in f7ec42e
F-11Medium: credentials at rest in a configuration file readable by the service group, and one {:?} away from the logflow, deploymentflow/src/config.rs:46, :64, :73, :74; flow/config/subscribers.example.yml:29, :43, :44Storage credentials were plain values in the subscriber YAML, in String fields of a struct that derives Debug. No log line printed the structfixed in 4655eb0, ed0b17b: references, _file variants, type Secret
F-12Low: one byte of the key and its offset in an error messageflowflow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:46The base64 error of cloud_access_key was quotedfixed in 4655eb0
F-13Low: the access key id, not the secret, in a log lineflowflow/src/sink/aws_s3.rs:60A store's error answer that quotes the access key id was reported wholefixed in 4655eb0: both keys are removed from the text
F-14Medium: whoever answers for the endpoint, or sits on the path of an http:// one, receives every record at an address of their choiceflowflow/src/sink/rest.rs:34, flow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:60The HTTP clients followed redirects; a 307 or 308 re-sends the recordfixed in 4655eb0
F-15Low: the endpoint makes the process hold and log an answer of any sizeflowflow/src/sink/rest.rs:60, flow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:131An error answer was read whole and quoted wholefixed in 4655eb0: 1 MiB read, 512 characters quoted
F-16Low: a password or token an operator put in the endpoint URL reaches the logflowflow/src/sink/rest.rs:86, :93; flow/src/sink/mod.rs:39The REST URL, and the URL inside a request error, were logged as configuredfixed in 4655eb0
F-17Low: needs control of a topic and a store or proxy that normalises paths; an object lands outside its prefix or bucketflowflow/src/sink/object_path.rs:11, :20A topic was placed in an object name unchanged, .. segments includedfixed in 4655eb0
F-18Low: whatever is at the configured publisher address makes the process hold a message of any sizeflowflow/src/feed.rs:68The SUB socket had no message size limitfixed in 4655eb0: 16 MiB
F-19Low: an operator binds a publisher beyond loopback without seeing what that exposesflowflow/src/publish.rs:108A PUB socket bound to a reachable address gave no sign that it serves every record without authenticationfixed in 4655eb0: a startup warning. The absence of authentication on the socket is accepted; see the threat model
F-20Medium: a dictionary a visitor was handed freezes or crashes the tabsitesite/decoder/decoder.js:297, :717The bit view drew eight elements for every byte up to the last field of the message; any number of files was readfixed in 177ba08
F-21Low: needs a hostile PATH at install time or an earlier loosened filedeploymentdeployment/install.sh:13, :175, :185, :209The installer ran with the caller's PATH and umask, left the mode and owner of kept configuration as found, and wrote --prefix into the unit uncheckedfixed in ed0b17b; measured in a container: 750 root:firstbite on both directories, 640 root:firstbite on the environment file and both configuration files after they had been set to 666/777
F-22Low: other local users list the names of record filesdeploymentdeployment/first-bite.service:22StateDirectory was created 0755fixed in ed0b17b: StateDirectoryMode=0750. systemd-analyze security --offline scores the unit 3.4
F-23Low: CVE-2026-0799 needs a crafted filter program and first-bite compiles only the operator's --filter text; CVE-2026-6554 is reachable from a crafted packet only when that filter uses protochainrelease buildtools/libpcap-static.sh:15The release binaries link libpcap 1.10.5, which has CVE-2026-0799, CVE-2026-6554 and CVE-2025-11961fixed in ac21071: 1.10.7. Measured: the library builds with the script's flags in Alpine 3.24. Not measured: make portable and make static with it
F-24LowcontainerDockerfile:21The pinned base image predates three fixed zlib advisories (CVE-2026-76844, CVE-2026-85091, CVE-2026-27171)fixed in ac21071: the image upgrades its packages
F-25Low: a moved tag changes what a developer runsmocksmocks/azure/compose.yml:7, mocks/s3/compose.yml:7, mocks/elastic/compose.yml:7; .github/dependabot.ymlThree images were referenced by tag only, and no Dependabot entry followed the pinned Dockerfile basesfixed in eee1a49
F-26Low: only in a build with the zenoh feature; a Zenoh peer sends crafted compressed datadependenciesCargo.lock (lz4_flex 0.10.0)RUSTSEC-2026-0041: decompression can read uninitialised memoryaccepted: zenoh is pinned to =1.9.0 to match the fabric it joins; the ignore in .cargo/audit.toml goes when that pin moves
F-27Low: the image's own libpcapcontainerDockerfile:23 (libpcap0.8t64 1.10.5-2)Debian trixie's libpcap has the CVEs of F-23; Debian marks them minor and has released no fixaccepted: same reachability as F-23; the fix arrives through the base image
F-29Medium while the repository is private, higher once publicGitHubrepository settingsSecret scanning, push protection, Dependabot alerts and private vulnerability reporting are off, and main has no ruleset beyond the organisation's signature ruleopen; owner: repository owner. The calls are in Repository settings

Scanner summaries

ScannerVersionTargetResult
cargo audit0.23.0, 1,509 advisoriesCargo.lock, 481 crates0 vulnerabilities reported with .cargo/audit.toml (one ignored: RUSTSEC-2026-0041, F-26). 3 warnings, all unmaintained crates reached only through zenoh: paste (RUSTSEC-2024-0436), rustls-pemfile (RUSTSEC-2025-0134), unsafe-libyaml (RUSTSEC-2024-0449)
cargo deny check advisories licenses bans sources0.20.2all featuresadvisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok: the same four advisories; cargo deny does not read .cargo/audit.toml, and the repository's gate is check licenses bans sources, which passes
osv-scanner1.4.3Cargo.lockthe same four, and RUSTSEC-2020-0153 against bite 0.2.0: a false match on the name of an unrelated crates.io crate; the workspace crate is not published
gitleaks dir8.30.0published file setbefore: 4 (the Azurite development key in three files, a base64 placeholder in subscribers.example.yml). After: no leaks found
gitleaks git8.30.0public repository, 1 commit4: the same four, in the initial commit. None is a credential
trivy image0.58.1image of the Dockerfile, Debian 13.7before: 0 critical, 50 high, 96 medium, 68 low; 3 with a fix released. After: 0 critical, 48 high, 95 medium, 68 low; 0 with a fix released. All are Debian packages. The Rust binaries carry no dependency list for trivy to read; cargo audit covers them
zizmor --offline1.32.0.github/workflows1 high: pull_request_target in leak-gate.yml. Read and accepted: the job executes only the base branch's script and reads the pull request as data; the script no longer follows symbolic links. Annotated in the workflow
tools/check-pins.pythis treeworkflows, Dockerfile, compose files, Makefileok; every uses: is a 40-character SHA
tools/check-public-tree.shthis treepublished file setok. One hit of the new classes was fixed: a test URL that read as an e-mail address
unsafe countgrepfirst-party Rust0 occurrences in bite, bite-wasm, mind, flow, cotify, datamodels, logger
systemd-analyze security --offlinesystemd 259deployment/first-bite.serviceexposure 3.4 (OK)

Manual review

Checked, with the result. A row that says none found names what was read.

ClassReadResult
Out-of-bounds, overflow and panics on packet bytesbite/src/bits.rs, bite/src/decode.rs, mind/src/pipeline.rs, mind/src/source.rsNone found. extract refuses a range that is empty, over 64 bits or past the payload before it indexes; byte fields use get; frames are sliced by etherparse, whose error skips the frame; timestamps are clamped. F-05 is outside the decode path
Allocation and CPU from a hostile packetthe same, and mind/src/run.rsDecoding costs at most the fields of one message; a record is at most one frame twice in base64. F-07
Allocation and CPU from a hostile dictionarybite/src/dictionary.rs, schema.rs, vectors.rs, jsonschema.rs, bite-wasm/src/api.rsF-01 to F-04, F-06. Deep nesting: refused by the JSON parser at 128 levels
Path handlingbite/src/dictionary.rs, flow/src/sink/local_log.rs, message_rates.rs, object_path.rs, mind/src/run.rsNo message, field or interface name becomes a file path: file paths come only from configuration and the command line. Object names: F-17
Log injectionevery info!, warn!, error!, debug! in mind, flow, loggerF-10. Records are logged as JSON, which escapes control characters
Credential leakageflow/src/config.rs, every sink, every {:?}F-11, F-12, F-13, F-16. No log line printed a configuration struct
TLS, redirects, request forgeryflow/src/sink/rest.rs, azure_blob.rs, aws_s3.rs, zenoh.rs, Cargo.tomlTLS verification is on (rustls-tls; no danger_accept_invalid_certs anywhere). Endpoints come only from configuration; no record content selects a host. F-14
ZeroMQ exposureflow/src/publish.rs, feed.rs, flow/config/publishers.local.yml, docker/The built-in publisher binds 127.0.0.1. F-18, F-19
Cursor-on-Target XMLcotify/src/event.rsNone found: every value is written through quick-xml attributes, which escape
The decoder pagesite/decoder/decoder.js, index.htmlNo innerHTML, outerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, document.write or eval; text goes through textContent and setAttribute; style strings are built from numbers. F-20
install.shdeployment/install.shQuoting is sound; the staged dictionary and environment file are created inside the root-owned directory. F-21
systemd unitdeployment/first-bite.serviceCapabilities are bounded to the two capture ones; the sandbox directives match what the binary uses. F-22
DockerfileDockerfile, .dockerignore, docker/compose.ymlRuns as firstbite (uid 999, measured); both bases pinned by digest; private/ excluded from the build context. F-24, F-27
Workflows.github/workflows/*.ymlEvery uses: pinned by SHA. Top-level permissions: contents: read in all seven; write scopes only on the release publish job and the code-scanning uploads. The one pull_request_target job runs no pull-request code. The only secret, LEAK_NEEDLES, is read by that job alone

Not scanned, not measured

WhatWhy
make portable and make static with libpcap 1.10.7the library alone was built; the two release builds were not run
The unit under systemd with a live captureno root on the build host; systemd-analyze reads the unit offline
The decoder page in a browserthe change was checked with node --check only
CodeQL and Scorecard resultsboth workflows skip while the repository is private

Repository settings

Read with GET on 2026-11-15; nothing was changed. goatcore is the reference.

Settingfirst-bite nowgoatcoreCall that sets it
Secret scanningdisabledenabledgh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning][status]=enabled'
Push protectiondisabledenabledgh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_push_protection][status]=enabled'
Non-provider patternsdisabledenabledgh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_non_provider_patterns][status]=enabled'
Validity checksdisabledenabledgh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_validity_checks][status]=enabled'
Dependabot alertsdisabled (404)enabled (204)gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/vulnerability-alerts
Dependabot security updatesdisableddisabledgh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/automated-security-fixes (version updates already come from .github/dependabot.yml)
Private vulnerability reportingoff (404)enabledgh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/private-vulnerability-reporting
Commit sign-off on web commitsfalsetruegh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -F web_commit_signoff_required=true
Ruleset on mainthe organisation's signed-and-verified-commits onlythat, and main-protection: no deletion, no force push, signatures, pull request with squash only, required checksgh api -X POST repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/rulesets --input ruleset-main.json, with the body below
Ruleset on release tagsnonerelease-tags: creation, update and deletion restrictedgh api -X POST repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/rulesets --input ruleset-tags.json, with the body below
Actions: default token permissionsread; cannot approve pull requeststhe sameno change
Actions: allowed actionsall; SHA pinning not requiredthe samegh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/actions/permissions -F enabled=true -f allowed_actions=all -F sha_pinning_required=true (every action in the tree is pinned)
Actions: approval for fork pull requestsnot available on a private repositoryall external contributorsafter publication: gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/actions/permissions/fork-pr-contributor-approval -f approval_policy=all_external_contributors
Merge methodssquash only; branches deleted on mergesquash and rebaseno change
Code scanningneeds Code Security on a private repositoryworkflow-basedno call: codeql.yml runs once the repository is public

On a private repository, secret scanning and push protection need GitHub Secret Protection on the organisation's plan; on a public one they are free.

ruleset-main.json:

{
  "name": "main-protection",
  "target": "branch",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {"ref_name": {"include": ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], "exclude": []}},
  "rules": [
    {"type": "deletion"},
    {"type": "non_fast_forward"},
    {"type": "required_signatures"},
    {"type": "pull_request", "parameters": {
      "allowed_merge_methods": ["squash"],
      "dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push": true,
      "require_code_owner_review": false,
      "require_last_push_approval": false,
      "required_approving_review_count": 0,
      "required_review_thread_resolution": false}},
    {"type": "required_status_checks", "parameters": {
      "strict_required_status_checks_policy": false,
      "do_not_enforce_on_create": false,
      "required_status_checks": [{"context": "leak-gate"}, {"context": "scripts"}]}}
  ]
}

leak-gate and scripts run on every pull request. The Rust jobs of ci.yml are skipped for documentation-only changes, and a skipped matrix job does not report the per-platform names, so the ruleset requires the ci job of that workflow instead: it always runs and fails if any other job failed. goatcore requires zero approving reviews; CONTRIBUTING.md here says one from a code owner, which is "required_approving_review_count": 1 with "require_code_owner_review": true.

ruleset-tags.json:

{
  "name": "release-tags",
  "target": "tag",
  "enforcement": "active",
  "conditions": {"ref_name": {"include": ["refs/tags/v*"], "exclude": []}},
  "rules": [{"type": "creation"}, {"type": "update"}, {"type": "deletion"}],
  "bypass_actors": [{"actor_id": 5, "actor_type": "RepositoryRole", "bypass_mode": "always"}]
}

actor_id 5 is the repository admin role: only admins create, move or delete a release tag.

The source of this page is a Markdown file in the repository.