Security assessment, November 2026
Scope: the tree at commit ff35ab3 and the commits that follow it on the security branch. Scanners were run on Cargo.lock, the published file set (every tracked file outside private/, docs/plan.md and docs/decisions.md), the one-commit history of the public repository, the image the Dockerfile builds, and the workflows. The code named in Manual review was read line by line.
Status words: fixed in a commit (the change is in the tree and its test passes), accepted (left as it is, with the reason), open (not resolved here; the owner is named).
Severity is reasoned from who must control what, and what they gain.
Findings
File and line are those of commit ff35ab3, where the defect was.
| Id | Severity | Component | File:line | What | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-01 | Low: needs control of a dictionary file; a panic in builds with overflow checks, a wrong label key in release builds | bite | bite/src/schema.rs:214 | A values key with two signs (--170141183460469231731687303715884105728, -0x-8000…) reached -value with i128::MIN: "attempt to negate with overflow". --5 parsed as 5 | fixed in d7859ed; bite/tests/hostile_dictionary.rs fails on the old parser |
| F-02 | Medium: a dictionary received from someone else exhausts memory or CPU of the decoder, or of the browser tab | bite | bite/src/dictionary.rs:771, :613, :696, :517, :745 | No limit on the size of a dictionary file, the number of files, the fields of a message, the entries of a values object or the bit position a field may name | fixed in d7859ed: limits in bite/src/limits.rs, listed in docs/dictionary-format.md |
| F-03 | Low: CPU, quadratic in the size of one interface | bite | bite/src/dictionary.rs:537 | Every message file was compared against every message_type name | fixed in d7859ed |
| F-04 | Low: memory and log volume | bite | bite/src/dictionary.rs:702, :525, :712 | A finding quoted a dictionary key or label in full, whatever its length | fixed in d7859ed: quoted text is cut to 80 characters |
| F-05 | Low: not reachable through a loaded dictionary; public functions | bite | bite/src/bits.rs:53, :58 | sign_extend with width 0 and swap_bytes with width 0 or over 64 overflow a shift | fixed in d7859ed |
| F-06 | Low: needs write access to the dictionary directory; the loader blocks | bite | bite/src/dictionary.rs:371 | An entry of vectors/ that is not a regular file (a FIFO named x.json) was opened and read | fixed in d7859ed |
| F-07 | Medium: a host on the tapped link sends large frames while the pipeline is behind; up to 4 GiB held by the capture process | mind | mind/src/source.rs:186, :221 | The queue between capture threads and the pipeline was bounded at 65,536 frames and not in bytes | fixed in f5322a1: 256 MiB |
| F-08 | Low: a host that can reach UDP 12345 injects records; development mode only | mind | mind/src/cli.rs:22 | --mock bound 0.0.0.0 by default | fixed in f5322a1 |
| F-09 | Low: another local user reads records, under a permissive umask and outside the systemd unit | mind, flow | mind/src/run.rs:61, flow/src/sink/local_log.rs:30, flow/src/sink/message_rates.rs:53, :71 | Record files were created with the mode the umask allowed | fixed in f5322a1, 4655eb0: mode 0640 |
| F-10 | Medium: whoever controls a topic on the subscribed socket, an HTTP endpoint's error answer or a dictionary file name writes arbitrary lines and terminal escape sequences into the log | logger, flow | logger/src/loggers.rs:65, :75; sources flow/src/subscribe.rs:130, flow/src/sink/mod.rs:40 | Log arguments were written as they came, line breaks included | fixed in f7ec42e |
| F-11 | Medium: credentials at rest in a configuration file readable by the service group, and one {:?} away from the log | flow, deployment | flow/src/config.rs:46, :64, :73, :74; flow/config/subscribers.example.yml:29, :43, :44 | Storage credentials were plain values in the subscriber YAML, in String fields of a struct that derives Debug. No log line printed the struct | fixed in 4655eb0, ed0b17b: references, _file variants, type Secret |
| F-12 | Low: one byte of the key and its offset in an error message | flow | flow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:46 | The base64 error of cloud_access_key was quoted | fixed in 4655eb0 |
| F-13 | Low: the access key id, not the secret, in a log line | flow | flow/src/sink/aws_s3.rs:60 | A store's error answer that quotes the access key id was reported whole | fixed in 4655eb0: both keys are removed from the text |
| F-14 | Medium: whoever answers for the endpoint, or sits on the path of an http:// one, receives every record at an address of their choice | flow | flow/src/sink/rest.rs:34, flow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:60 | The HTTP clients followed redirects; a 307 or 308 re-sends the record | fixed in 4655eb0 |
| F-15 | Low: the endpoint makes the process hold and log an answer of any size | flow | flow/src/sink/rest.rs:60, flow/src/sink/azure_blob.rs:131 | An error answer was read whole and quoted whole | fixed in 4655eb0: 1 MiB read, 512 characters quoted |
| F-16 | Low: a password or token an operator put in the endpoint URL reaches the log | flow | flow/src/sink/rest.rs:86, :93; flow/src/sink/mod.rs:39 | The REST URL, and the URL inside a request error, were logged as configured | fixed in 4655eb0 |
| F-17 | Low: needs control of a topic and a store or proxy that normalises paths; an object lands outside its prefix or bucket | flow | flow/src/sink/object_path.rs:11, :20 | A topic was placed in an object name unchanged, .. segments included | fixed in 4655eb0 |
| F-18 | Low: whatever is at the configured publisher address makes the process hold a message of any size | flow | flow/src/feed.rs:68 | The SUB socket had no message size limit | fixed in 4655eb0: 16 MiB |
| F-19 | Low: an operator binds a publisher beyond loopback without seeing what that exposes | flow | flow/src/publish.rs:108 | A PUB socket bound to a reachable address gave no sign that it serves every record without authentication | fixed in 4655eb0: a startup warning. The absence of authentication on the socket is accepted; see the threat model |
| F-20 | Medium: a dictionary a visitor was handed freezes or crashes the tab | site | site/decoder/decoder.js:297, :717 | The bit view drew eight elements for every byte up to the last field of the message; any number of files was read | fixed in 177ba08 |
| F-21 | Low: needs a hostile PATH at install time or an earlier loosened file | deployment | deployment/install.sh:13, :175, :185, :209 | The installer ran with the caller's PATH and umask, left the mode and owner of kept configuration as found, and wrote --prefix into the unit unchecked | fixed in ed0b17b; measured in a container: 750 root:firstbite on both directories, 640 root:firstbite on the environment file and both configuration files after they had been set to 666/777 |
| F-22 | Low: other local users list the names of record files | deployment | deployment/first-bite.service:22 | StateDirectory was created 0755 | fixed in ed0b17b: StateDirectoryMode=0750. systemd-analyze security --offline scores the unit 3.4 |
| F-23 | Low: CVE-2026-0799 needs a crafted filter program and first-bite compiles only the operator's --filter text; CVE-2026-6554 is reachable from a crafted packet only when that filter uses protochain | release build | tools/libpcap-static.sh:15 | The release binaries link libpcap 1.10.5, which has CVE-2026-0799, CVE-2026-6554 and CVE-2025-11961 | fixed in ac21071: 1.10.7. Measured: the library builds with the script's flags in Alpine 3.24. Not measured: make portable and make static with it |
| F-24 | Low | container | Dockerfile:21 | The pinned base image predates three fixed zlib advisories (CVE-2026-76844, CVE-2026-85091, CVE-2026-27171) | fixed in ac21071: the image upgrades its packages |
| F-25 | Low: a moved tag changes what a developer runs | mocks | mocks/azure/compose.yml:7, mocks/s3/compose.yml:7, mocks/elastic/compose.yml:7; .github/dependabot.yml | Three images were referenced by tag only, and no Dependabot entry followed the pinned Dockerfile bases | fixed in eee1a49 |
| F-26 | Low: only in a build with the zenoh feature; a Zenoh peer sends crafted compressed data | dependencies | Cargo.lock (lz4_flex 0.10.0) | RUSTSEC-2026-0041: decompression can read uninitialised memory | accepted: zenoh is pinned to =1.9.0 to match the fabric it joins; the ignore in .cargo/audit.toml goes when that pin moves |
| F-27 | Low: the image's own libpcap | container | Dockerfile:23 (libpcap0.8t64 1.10.5-2) | Debian trixie's libpcap has the CVEs of F-23; Debian marks them minor and has released no fix | accepted: same reachability as F-23; the fix arrives through the base image |
| F-29 | Medium while the repository is private, higher once public | GitHub | repository settings | Secret scanning, push protection, Dependabot alerts and private vulnerability reporting are off, and main has no ruleset beyond the organisation's signature rule | open; owner: repository owner. The calls are in Repository settings |
Scanner summaries
| Scanner | Version | Target | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
cargo audit | 0.23.0, 1,509 advisories | Cargo.lock, 481 crates | 0 vulnerabilities reported with .cargo/audit.toml (one ignored: RUSTSEC-2026-0041, F-26). 3 warnings, all unmaintained crates reached only through zenoh: paste (RUSTSEC-2024-0436), rustls-pemfile (RUSTSEC-2025-0134), unsafe-libyaml (RUSTSEC-2024-0449) |
cargo deny check advisories licenses bans sources | 0.20.2 | all features | advisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok: the same four advisories; cargo deny does not read .cargo/audit.toml, and the repository's gate is check licenses bans sources, which passes |
osv-scanner | 1.4.3 | Cargo.lock | the same four, and RUSTSEC-2020-0153 against bite 0.2.0: a false match on the name of an unrelated crates.io crate; the workspace crate is not published |
gitleaks dir | 8.30.0 | published file set | before: 4 (the Azurite development key in three files, a base64 placeholder in subscribers.example.yml). After: no leaks found |
gitleaks git | 8.30.0 | public repository, 1 commit | 4: the same four, in the initial commit. None is a credential |
trivy image | 0.58.1 | image of the Dockerfile, Debian 13.7 | before: 0 critical, 50 high, 96 medium, 68 low; 3 with a fix released. After: 0 critical, 48 high, 95 medium, 68 low; 0 with a fix released. All are Debian packages. The Rust binaries carry no dependency list for trivy to read; cargo audit covers them |
zizmor --offline | 1.32.0 | .github/workflows | 1 high: pull_request_target in leak-gate.yml. Read and accepted: the job executes only the base branch's script and reads the pull request as data; the script no longer follows symbolic links. Annotated in the workflow |
tools/check-pins.py | this tree | workflows, Dockerfile, compose files, Makefile | ok; every uses: is a 40-character SHA |
tools/check-public-tree.sh | this tree | published file set | ok. One hit of the new classes was fixed: a test URL that read as an e-mail address |
unsafe count | grep | first-party Rust | 0 occurrences in bite, bite-wasm, mind, flow, cotify, datamodels, logger |
systemd-analyze security --offline | systemd 259 | deployment/first-bite.service | exposure 3.4 (OK) |
Manual review
Checked, with the result. A row that says none found names what was read.
| Class | Read | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Out-of-bounds, overflow and panics on packet bytes | bite/src/bits.rs, bite/src/decode.rs, mind/src/pipeline.rs, mind/src/source.rs | None found. extract refuses a range that is empty, over 64 bits or past the payload before it indexes; byte fields use get; frames are sliced by etherparse, whose error skips the frame; timestamps are clamped. F-05 is outside the decode path |
| Allocation and CPU from a hostile packet | the same, and mind/src/run.rs | Decoding costs at most the fields of one message; a record is at most one frame twice in base64. F-07 |
| Allocation and CPU from a hostile dictionary | bite/src/dictionary.rs, schema.rs, vectors.rs, jsonschema.rs, bite-wasm/src/api.rs | F-01 to F-04, F-06. Deep nesting: refused by the JSON parser at 128 levels |
| Path handling | bite/src/dictionary.rs, flow/src/sink/local_log.rs, message_rates.rs, object_path.rs, mind/src/run.rs | No message, field or interface name becomes a file path: file paths come only from configuration and the command line. Object names: F-17 |
| Log injection | every info!, warn!, error!, debug! in mind, flow, logger | F-10. Records are logged as JSON, which escapes control characters |
| Credential leakage | flow/src/config.rs, every sink, every {:?} | F-11, F-12, F-13, F-16. No log line printed a configuration struct |
| TLS, redirects, request forgery | flow/src/sink/rest.rs, azure_blob.rs, aws_s3.rs, zenoh.rs, Cargo.toml | TLS verification is on (rustls-tls; no danger_accept_invalid_certs anywhere). Endpoints come only from configuration; no record content selects a host. F-14 |
| ZeroMQ exposure | flow/src/publish.rs, feed.rs, flow/config/publishers.local.yml, docker/ | The built-in publisher binds 127.0.0.1. F-18, F-19 |
| Cursor-on-Target XML | cotify/src/event.rs | None found: every value is written through quick-xml attributes, which escape |
| The decoder page | site/decoder/decoder.js, index.html | No innerHTML, outerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, document.write or eval; text goes through textContent and setAttribute; style strings are built from numbers. F-20 |
install.sh | deployment/install.sh | Quoting is sound; the staged dictionary and environment file are created inside the root-owned directory. F-21 |
| systemd unit | deployment/first-bite.service | Capabilities are bounded to the two capture ones; the sandbox directives match what the binary uses. F-22 |
Dockerfile | Dockerfile, .dockerignore, docker/compose.yml | Runs as firstbite (uid 999, measured); both bases pinned by digest; private/ excluded from the build context. F-24, F-27 |
| Workflows | .github/workflows/*.yml | Every uses: pinned by SHA. Top-level permissions: contents: read in all seven; write scopes only on the release publish job and the code-scanning uploads. The one pull_request_target job runs no pull-request code. The only secret, LEAK_NEEDLES, is read by that job alone |
Not scanned, not measured
| What | Why |
|---|---|
make portable and make static with libpcap 1.10.7 | the library alone was built; the two release builds were not run |
| The unit under systemd with a live capture | no root on the build host; systemd-analyze reads the unit offline |
| The decoder page in a browser | the change was checked with node --check only |
| CodeQL and Scorecard results | both workflows skip while the repository is private |
Repository settings
Read with GET on 2026-11-15; nothing was changed. goatcore is the reference.
| Setting | first-bite now | goatcore | Call that sets it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Secret scanning | disabled | enabled | gh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning][status]=enabled' |
| Push protection | disabled | enabled | gh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_push_protection][status]=enabled' |
| Non-provider patterns | disabled | enabled | gh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_non_provider_patterns][status]=enabled' |
| Validity checks | disabled | enabled | gh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -f 'security_and_analysis[secret_scanning_validity_checks][status]=enabled' |
| Dependabot alerts | disabled (404) | enabled (204) | gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/vulnerability-alerts |
| Dependabot security updates | disabled | disabled | gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/automated-security-fixes (version updates already come from .github/dependabot.yml) |
| Private vulnerability reporting | off (404) | enabled | gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/private-vulnerability-reporting |
| Commit sign-off on web commits | false | true | gh api -X PATCH repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite -F web_commit_signoff_required=true |
Ruleset on main | the organisation's signed-and-verified-commits only | that, and main-protection: no deletion, no force push, signatures, pull request with squash only, required checks | gh api -X POST repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/rulesets --input ruleset-main.json, with the body below |
| Ruleset on release tags | none | release-tags: creation, update and deletion restricted | gh api -X POST repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/rulesets --input ruleset-tags.json, with the body below |
| Actions: default token permissions | read; cannot approve pull requests | the same | no change |
| Actions: allowed actions | all; SHA pinning not required | the same | gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/actions/permissions -F enabled=true -f allowed_actions=all -F sha_pinning_required=true (every action in the tree is pinned) |
| Actions: approval for fork pull requests | not available on a private repository | all external contributors | after publication: gh api -X PUT repos/USAREUR-AF/first-bite/actions/permissions/fork-pr-contributor-approval -f approval_policy=all_external_contributors |
| Merge methods | squash only; branches deleted on merge | squash and rebase | no change |
| Code scanning | needs Code Security on a private repository | workflow-based | no call: codeql.yml runs once the repository is public |
On a private repository, secret scanning and push protection need GitHub Secret Protection on the organisation's plan; on a public one they are free.
ruleset-main.json:
{
"name": "main-protection",
"target": "branch",
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {"ref_name": {"include": ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], "exclude": []}},
"rules": [
{"type": "deletion"},
{"type": "non_fast_forward"},
{"type": "required_signatures"},
{"type": "pull_request", "parameters": {
"allowed_merge_methods": ["squash"],
"dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push": true,
"require_code_owner_review": false,
"require_last_push_approval": false,
"required_approving_review_count": 0,
"required_review_thread_resolution": false}},
{"type": "required_status_checks", "parameters": {
"strict_required_status_checks_policy": false,
"do_not_enforce_on_create": false,
"required_status_checks": [{"context": "leak-gate"}, {"context": "scripts"}]}}
]
}
leak-gate and scripts run on every pull request. The Rust jobs of ci.yml are skipped for documentation-only changes, and a skipped matrix job does not report the per-platform names, so the ruleset requires the ci job of that workflow instead: it always runs and fails if any other job failed. goatcore requires zero approving reviews; CONTRIBUTING.md here says one from a code owner, which is "required_approving_review_count": 1 with "require_code_owner_review": true.
ruleset-tags.json:
{
"name": "release-tags",
"target": "tag",
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {"ref_name": {"include": ["refs/tags/v*"], "exclude": []}},
"rules": [{"type": "creation"}, {"type": "update"}, {"type": "deletion"}],
"bypass_actors": [{"actor_id": 5, "actor_type": "RepositoryRole", "bypass_mode": "always"}]
}
actor_id 5 is the repository admin role: only admins create, move or delete a release tag.
The source of this page is a Markdown file in the repository.